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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Shayne Richard VVarth appeals from the district court's order relinquishing 
jurisdiction. On appeal, he argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied his due 
process rights when it denied his motion to augment the record, and that the district 
court abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In docket no. 38854, the state charged Warth with trafficking in 
methamphetamine. (R., Vol. I, p.33.) In docket no. 38984, the state charged Warth 
with two counts of delivery of cocaine. (R., Vol. II, pp.178-79.) Pursuant to a global 
plea agreement, the state amended the trafficking charge to possession with the intent 
to deliver, and Warth pied guilty to all counts. (R., Vol. I, pp.52-55; Vol. II, pp.197-200; 
3/19/2007 Tr., p.13, Ls.11-24.) The district court entered judgments of conviction and 
imposed concurrent unified sentences of four years with one and a half years fixed on 
the possession with intent to deliver conviction, five years with two years fixed on the 
first delivery of cocaine conviction, and six years with two and a half years fixed on the 
second delivery of cocaine conviction. (R., Vol. I, pp.70-74; Vol. 11, pp.218-22; 
5/14/2007 Tr., p.47, Ls.9-24.) The district court suspended execution of the sentences 
and placed Warth on five years of probation. (R., Vol. I, pp.71-74; Vol. II, pp.219-22; 
5/14/2007 Tr., p.47, L.25 - p.49, L.9.) 
Warth received a probation violation report in October 2007 for using marijuana 
and violating a no contact order (R., Vo!. I, p.77), and received ten days discretionary 
jail time (R., Vol. I, p.81). Warth received a second probation violation report for 
1 
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state iater Nithdrew that probation vio!aton ieport (R., Vo!. !, p.89.) Warth received yet 
2:ncthe;- ;'.}robation violation report in Api·il 2009 for ieaving his assigned district so he 
couid purchase and sell illegal drugs, in addition to smoking marrjuana, drinking, and 
receiving pending charges in Bingham County for possession with intent to deliver. (R., 
Vol. !., pp.90-91; Vol. II, pp.237-38.) Warth admitted the violations and was continued 
on probation with the additional terms of successfuily completing the Wood Pilot Project 
and serving 120 days in county jail. (R, Vo!. I, p.105; VoL II, p.249.) Warth violated his 
probation again in September 2010 by getting terminated from the Wood Pilot Project 
for, among other things, using the synthetic cannabinoid, "Spice." (R.. Vol. I, pp.110-12; 
Vol. II, pp.253-55.) 
The district court revoked Warth's probation and imposed the underlying 
sentence, but retained jurisdiction and recommended the therapeutic community 
concurrent with a district court in Bingham County in an unrelated case. (R., Vol. I, 
pp.119-21; Vol. II, pp.261-64; 10/12/2010 Tr., p.8, Ls.8-13; see also p.7, Ls.1-4; p.7, 
L.24 -· p.8, L.3.) VVarth did not participate in the therapeutic community. (See R., VoL I, 
p.123; Vol. II, p.266.) Following the Bingham County district court's order relinquishing 
jurisdiction, the district court in this case also relinquished jurisdiction. (Id.) Warth filed 
a notice of appeal, timely only from the order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., Vol. !, 
pp.124-26; Vol. II, pp.268-70.)1 
Warth's appeats, fiied in docket nos. 38854 and 38984, respectively, were later 
consolidated for all purposes by the Idaho Suprerne Cou:i. (See Order Consolidating 
J\ppea!s, filed July 20, 2011.) 
2 
Pending appeal, V\/arth's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the settled 
with transcripts from the June 29, 2009 violation admit/deny hearing 
a the May 9, 2011 Rule 35 hearing. (tvfotion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter "Motion to Augment"), filed 
November 2, 2011.) The state objected to Warth's motion to augment. (Objection to 
r,~otion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed November 3, 2011.) 
Finding that Warth failed to show the transcripts were relevant to issues on this appeal, 
the Idaho Supreme Court denied Warth's request for the transcripts. (Order Denying 
Motion to Augment and to Suspend The Briefing Schedule (hereinafter "Order Denying 
Motion to Augment"), filed November 16, 2011.) 
3 
lS.:3t}ES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Cm.:rt dsny Mr. V\/2nh due process and 
equal protecbcr. when tt denied his f\fotion to Augment with the requested 
transcript? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it re!inquished 
iurisdiction? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. 
VVarth's sentences sua sponte upon relinquishing jurisdiction? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Warth failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with an 
irrelevant transcript? 
2. Has VVarth failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion, either by relinquishing jurisdiction or by not sua sponte reducing Warth's 
sentence after relinquishing jurisdiction? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
\/Varth's Claim That Denial Of His Motlon To Auament The Appellate Record VVith 
Irrelevant Items Vvas A Due Process Or Eauai Protection Violation Is V\fithout Merit 
Introduction 
the appellate record was settled, Warth filed a motion to augment the 
with various items, including as-yet unprepared transcripts of the June 29, 2009 
probation violation admission and disposition hearing and May 2011 I.C.R. 35 
hearing. (Motion to Augment.) The Idaho Supreme Court, finding that Warth failed to 
he requested were relevant to his 
motion to augment. (Order Denying Motion to Augment.) 
Warth now contends that, by denying his motion to augment 
Warth's 
appellate record 
with the requested transcript from the June 29, 2009 admit/deny hearing, the Idaho 
Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection 
and denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 2 (Appellant's brief, pp.5-14.) 
Warth's argument is without merit. Due process and equal protection require the state 
only to provide a record sufficient for appellate review of the errors alleged. Because 
the denied transcript is not relevant to, much less necessary for, appellate review of the 
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction (the only issue over which this Court has 
jurisdiction), Warth has failed to show any error in the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of 
his motion to augment. 
2 On appeal, Warth appears to have abandoned his claim from his Motion to Augment 
that he was entitled to a transcript of the May 9, 2011 I.C.R. 35 hearing. (Compare 
Motion to Appellant's brief, pp.5-14.) 
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B. Standard Of Review 
deferer.ce to factual findings, uniess tr.ey are clearly ermneOL.:s, but fres :-ev;evv of 
whether constitutior.al requirements have t>een satisfied in light of the facts found. State 
v. Bromoard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C Warth Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The Requested 
Auqmentation 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is sufficient 
for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings below." 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. 
\/Vashington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. 
VVashington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958): Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however, "will not be required to expend its 
funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to 
consideration of the appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.8. v. S.LJ, 519 
U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the 
trial record that are germane to consideration of the appeal") (internal citations omitted); 
Lane, 372 U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the record is not 
sufficient, the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his 
abiiity to pursue the appeal. State v. Polsort, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-
35 (1968) (distinguishir.g Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). Se,9 
also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice, VVarth 
6 
"must present something more than gross speculatio'l that the transcripts were requisite 
to a fa:r appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). V\/arth has failed to 
carry this burden. 
VVarth's appeal is timely on!y from the district court's March 8, 2011 Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction. (R., Vol. I, pp.123-26: Voi. ii, pp.266-70.) VVarth argues that 
the !daho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection by denying his 
motion to augment the appellate record with the as-yet unprepared transcript of his 
June 29, 2009 admit/deny and disposition hearing (Appellant's brief, pp.5-14), but he 
has failed to explain, much less demonstrate, how the transcript of that hearing is 
necessary to decide the only issue over which this Court has Jurisdiction on this appeal. 
There is no evidence that the district court had that transcript in front of it when it 
relinquished jurisdiction in March 2011, nor is there any indication that the court relied 
upon anything said at that previous hearing as a basis for its decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction. Because the as-yet unprepared transcript was never presented to the 
district court in relation to the Jurisdictional review, it was never part of the record before 
the district court and is not properly considered for the first time on appeal. See State v. 
Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972,974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a 
decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review of the 
record made below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never before the trial 
court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct App. 1995) 
("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and consider new 
evidence."). Warth has failed to show how the requested transcript of a hearing held in 
connection with the disposition of prior probation violations is relevant to any issue 
7 
C0L:rt has j:...~isdictior; on appsaL 
'd- I-·•, "'P. ')8 "·18 p "d 5 8 (Ct A.pp ?QQO) '"1-~t a"'pc.'l~t- "~c.,.,;r;,w ror~1 a -en~·e·~c"" fh..-.t '1s I· d..:U LV 1 L , L . .j 1 , • t , L.. v, Uta ;....1 .._...J a .. c H.:,..v~, ...... L J . ~ l d ",J" ..1;0. 
ordered into execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing 
when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring betvveen the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." (See Appel!anfs brief, p.11.) Hanington 
d'.Jes not support VVarth's claim of entitlement to the requested transcript. First, the 
June 2009 hearing, which resulted in Warth continuing on probation, ls entirely 
irrelevant to his appeal. Second, Warth's appeal is not timely from the district court's 
June 2009 order continuing his probation, so he cannot challenge it Finally, Hanington 
does not stand for the proposition that a merits-based review of a trial court's decision to 
order a sentence executed following either a period of probation or a period of retained 
jurisdiction requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate record of transcripts of 
every hearing over which the trial court presided. To the contrary, the law ls well 
established that, absent a showing that evidence was presented at prior hearings, 
and/or that the district court relied on such evidence in reaching its decision to revoke 
probation or relinquish jurisdiction, an appellant is not entitled to transcription at public 
expense of every hearing conducted before the date probation was finally revoked or 
jurisdiction was relinquished. Mayerv. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) (state 
is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or ail of the stenographic 
transcript ... will not be germane to consideratfon of the appeal") ( citation and internal 
quotations omitted); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 ("[T]he tact that an appellant with funds 
Q (.1 
choose to waste his money by unnecessarily including in all of 
transcripts not mean that the State must waste its by IS 
unnecessary for adequate appellate review."): see also Strand, 137 Idaho 462-63, 50 
P.3d at 477-78 (indigent appeliant challenging denial of Rule 35 motion not entitled to 
transcription at public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which no evidence was presented). 
Although there may be some circumstances that require the inclusion in the 
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review a trial court's decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction, VVarth has failed to show that any such circumstances apply here. 
VVarth has failed to nt to anything in the record that would indicate that what 
happened at the June 2009 admit/deny hearing was considered or played any role in 
the district court's decision in March 2011 to relinquish jurisdiction. Warth has therefore 
failed to show that the transcript is necessary to complete an adequate record on this 
appeal. 
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Warth also claims that if he 
can make a "colorabie argument" that he needs an "item" or "items" to complete a 
record, the burden transfers to the state "to prove that the requested items are not 
necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief, p.10.) He also argues, with no citation 
whatsoever, that "to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection," the state must provide him (and all indigent defendants) with whatever 
appellate record he desires unless the state proves that "some or all of the requested 
materials are unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p.7; see also p.5 ("The only 
way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested 
9 
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appealed, cha!lenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of p1csecutoriai 
misconduct. Id. at 190. The appeiiate court denied his request for a tria1 transsript at 
government expense on t:1e basis of a local rule pmviding that verbatim transcripts of 
trial proceedings would be provided at government expense on!y for felonies. kL at 
191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was entitled to a record of his trial, but 
whether he was entitled to a verbatim transcript of his trial. l5i_ at 193. The Court noted 
it had addressed a similar issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where 
the Court held that the government need not provide transcripts that were not "germane 
to consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds 
unnecessarily in such circumstances." Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draoer, 372 
U.S. at 495-96). However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record where that is 
necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be available to the 
defendant with resources to pay his own way." kl at 195. "Moreover, where the 
grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, 
the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' 
will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds." kl 
Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must establish 
that a record cf certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. kl at 194. Only after 
the gerrnaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is established and a 
co!orab!e need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant wt!! the burden shift to 
10 
the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some record other than a verbatim 
transcript \Viii be adequate. Id. at 194-95. See also Britt v. North Carolina, 404 ,U.S. 
226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether a requested record is necessary, the Court 
should consider the "va!ue of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the 
appeal," but the standard does not require "a showing of need tailored to the facts of the 
particular case" and the Court may take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
Here the only proceeding chal!enged on appeal is the relinquishment of 
jurisdiction on March 8, 2011. The record related to the district court's decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction is complete. Vvarth has failed to establish that the requested 
transcript is necessary to create an adequate appellate record to review the court's 
order relinquishing jurisdiction. Nothing in the record suggests that the transcript Warth 
requested in his augmentation was before the district court in relation to its jurisdictional 
review. Because VJarth failed to make a showing of germaneness and colorable need 
for the requested transcript, there is no burden on the state. Because all of the 
evidence before the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for 
appellate review, and Warth has failed to establish a violation of his due process rights. 3 
Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Warth has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment the record 
on appeal with an irrelevant transcript denied him equal protection. Warth cites to 
3 As a component of his due process claim, Warth also argues that the denial of his 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcript has deprived him of effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-14.) Because Warth has 
failed to show that the requested transcript is necessary, or even relevant, for appellate 
review of the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction, there is no possibility that 
the denial of the motion to augment has deprived Warth of effective assistance of 
counsel on this appeal. 
11 
( 1 963).) However, there is nothing in the record that in ar:y way indicates that the !dah:) 
Sup:·eme Court denied Warth's request for the transcript solely because he is indigent. 
1n fact, Warth's motion would have proper!)' besn denied even if he had the funds to pay 
for the transcript. The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seekir.g augmentation to 
set forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. !.A.R. 30. VVarth·s 
motion to augment failed because he failed to meet this rninlmal burden, imposed upon 
al! parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even helpful in addressing 
appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order properly denied the motion to 
augment because Warth failed to make a showing that any appellant - indigent or 
otherwise - would be entitlE:d to augment the record as requested. The rule applies to 
ail partles 1 not just the indigent. 
VVarth is entitled to a record adequate for appellate review of the district court's 
order relinquishing jurisdiction and nothing more. He has failed to show that the 
requested transcript is relevant to appellate review, much less that it is necessary for 
adequate appellate review. Having failed to make any such showing, his motion to 
augment the record with an irrelevant transcript that was never before the district court 
is properly denied. Having failed to show his due process and equal protection rights 
we,e implicated, much less violated, by that denial, Warth has failed to show any basis 
fer relief. 
12 
VVarth Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentendng Disc,etiQJJ. 
Introduction 
Vvarth was sent on riders court in this case and 
court in an unrelated case out of Bingham County. After the district court in Bingham 
County relinquished jurisdiction, the district court in this case also relinquished 
jurisdiction. Warth argues that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
iction, claiming he performed admirably under confined supervision. (Appellant's 
, pp.14-18.) Aiternatively, VJarth argues the district court abused its discretion 
by not sua sponte reducing his sentence when it relinquished jurisdiction. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.18-21.) Warth has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
8. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
VVarth Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused !ts Discretion By 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
Whether to grant probation "is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court." 
I.C. § 19-2601 (4). The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is also a matter of discretion 
See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711,712,639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 
203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A court's decision to re!inquish 
jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient 
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
13 
ad\1lsory arid is i:1 no v.,ray binding upon the court" State v. Hurst, '151 Idaho 430, __ , 
258 P.3d 950, 958 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. tv1erwin, -;31 Idaho 642, 648, 962 
P.2d : 026, 1032 (1998); State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 6'15, 798 P.2d 458, 460 (Ct. 
App. : 990)). Likewise, an offender's "[g]ood performance whLe en retaii1ed jurisdiction, 
though cornnendable, does not alone establish an abuse of discretion in the district 
judge's decision not to grant probation." Hurst, 151 Idaho at_, 258 P.3d at 958 
(citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290,292 (2001)). 
Following a probation violation, the dist,ict court revoked Warth's probation and 
retained jurisdiction, recommending the therapeutic community. (R., Vol. I, pp.119-21; 
Vol. II, pp.261-64.) A district court in Bingham County took the same action in an 
unrelated case. Warth, however, was not placed into the therapeutic community. (See 
APSI.) Later, the district court in Bingham County relinquished jurisdiction. 
!n the court ordered Addendum to Presentence Investigation, program managers 
at N:CI noted Warth's good behavior during the retained jurisdicUon and recommended 
probation. (See generally APSI) However, because the district court in Bingham 
County had relinquished jurisdiction, probation was not an option. (R., Vol. !, p.123; Vol. 
ii, p.266.) Warth had also failed to participate in the therapeutic community, as 
~ecommended by the district Gourt. (Id.; see also APS!.) The district court, therefore, 
relinquished jurisdiction, recommending again that Vv'arth participate in the therapeutic 
Cr,,..,,mun:~" r-:-i 'fol ' ,.., 1 "1·?· \ 101 11 p 2,..,6) ... /'iii, l~y. ,r\~, \ . l, t-.1~ it-..:>, · •. 01! • o . 
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On appeal, Warth ignores that probation was not an option in this case, instead 
focusing on his good performance while on retained jurisdiction and argurng that the 
district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.14-18,) Warth's good performance, "though commendable, does not alone establish 
an abuse of discretion in the district judge's decision not to grant probation." Hurst, 151 
Idaho at 258 P.3d at 958 (citing Statton, 136 Idaho at 137, 30 P.3d at 292). 
Because probation was not an option and because the district court wanted Warth to 
participate in the therapeutic community prior to placement on probation, Warth has 
failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. The court's 
order relinquishing jurisdiction should be affirmed. 
D. Warth Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing 
Discretion By Not, Sua Sponte, Reducing His Sentence Pursuant To Rule 35 
Upon relinquishing jurisdiction, the district court may, pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35, reduce an underlying sentence sua sponte. !.C.R. 35. A court's decision not 
to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-
established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington_, 
148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Marks. 116 Idaho 976, 978, 
783 P.2d 315, 317 (Ct. App. 1989)). Where a sentence is legal, those standards require 
an appellant to establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. 
Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 
Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, the appellant must show that the 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P. 3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary 
15 
reasonable sentenc:;e \\'here ree:sonabie minds t71igh~ differ. State v. Toohill, 103 !daho 
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 7·10 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Warth has failed to show that his sentence is excessive. In the :Jnderlying c:;ases, 
Warth was convicted of one count of possession with intent to deliver and two counts of 
delivery of cocaine, but still given an opportunity at probation. (R., Vo!. I, pp.70-74; Vo!. 
H, pp.218-22; 5/14/2007 Tr., p.47, L.9 - p.49, L.9.) Warth was not a successful 
probationer, receiving probation violation reports for using marijuana and violating a no 
contact order in October 2007 (R., Vol. I, p.77); by committing attempted strangulation, 
in addition to again violating a no contact order and smoking marijuana, in January 2008 
(R., Vol. I, pp.82, 86-87); by leaving his assigned district so he could purchase and sell 
illegal drugs, in addition to smoking marijuana, drinking, and receiving pending charges 
in Bingham County for possession with intent to deliver in April 2009 (R., Vol. I., pp.90-
91; Vol. !I, pp.237-38). After admitting his last violations, Warth was continued on 
probation with the additional terms of successfully completing the VVood Pilot Project 
and serving 120 days in county jail. (R., Vol. I, p.105; Vol. II, p.249.) Warth then 
violated his probation yet again in September 2010 by getting terminated from the VVood 
Pilot Project for, among other things, using the synthetic cannabinoid, "Spice." (R., Vol. 
I, pp.110-12, 117-18; Vol. I!, pp.253-55, 259-60.) 
When convicted on the underlying offenses in 2007, \/\/arth was only 18. yet he 
had already received charges for theft and property darr:age, stalking a:1d !::attery, and 
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supervision in confinernent does not entiHe t~) a reduction 0f h~s unde:riyjpg 
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CONCLUSION. 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
re!;nquish:ng jurisdiction. 
DATED this 27th day of April, 2012. 
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